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VaccinesSmallpox eradication, coordinated by the WHO and certified 40 years ago, led to the cessation of routine
smallpox vaccination in most countries. It is estimated that over 70% of the world’s population is no
longer protected against smallpox, and through cross-immunity, to closely related orthopox viruses such
as monkeypox. Monkeypox is now a re-emerging disease.
Monkeypox is endemic in as yet unconfirmed animal reservoirs in sub-Saharan Africa, while its human
epidemiology appears to be changing. Monkeypox in small animals imported from Ghana as exotic pets
was at the origin of an outbreak of human monkeypox in the USA in 2003. Travellers infected in Nigeria
were at the origin of monkeypox cases in the UK in 2018 and 2019, Israel in 2018 and Singapore in2019.
Together with sporadic reports of human infections with other orthopox viruses, these facts invite spec-
ulation that emergent or re-emergent human monkeypox might fill the epidemiological niche vacated by
smallpox.
An ad-hoc and unofficial group of interested experts met to consider these issues at Chatham House,







5078 K. Simpson et al. / Vaccine 38 (2020) 5077–5081Gaps identified by the experts included:
 understanding of zoonotic hosts, reservoirs and vectors.
 risks associated with transmission.
 full description of the clinical spectrum and the natural history of infection including an estimation of
the prevalence of monkeypox specific antibodies in humans living in areas of emergence.
The experts further agreed on the need for a better understanding of the genomic evolution and changing
epidemiology of orthopox viruses, the usefulness of in-field genomic diagnostics, and the best disease con-
trol strategies, including the possibility of vaccination with new generation non-replicating smallpox vac-
cines and treatment with recently developed antivirals.1. Introduction
The vaccinia virus vaccine that eradicated smallpox also pro-
tected against other orthopox infections, and if given within four
days of infection could modify or prevent onset of clinical disease
[1]. With the eradication of smallpox and the subsequent cessation
of routine smallpox vaccination [2,3], human monkeypox appeared
with increasing frequency in unvaccinated populations. Second-
generation smallpox vaccines have been demonstrated to protect
against monkeypox [4,5]. However, better understanding of the
epidemiology of monkeypox virus has gained importance.
Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, is thought to
have adapted to the human host as early as 3 to 4 thousand years
ago. Smallpox immunisation had existed in some form for at least
one thousand years, according to Chinese records [6,7]. Rational
vaccine design began with Jenner’s 1796 cowpox vaccine [8], made
from a virus that caused a usually mild disease, transmitted to
humans by animal hosts. Vaccination laid the basis for the eradica-
tion of Variola in 1980 [9]. Several orthopox viruses, including the
monkeypox virus, are thought to have caused similar mild and spo-
radic human illness prior to the innovation of smallpox vaccination
[10], and remain in circulation in animal hosts with periodic emer-
gence in human populations. Variola minor (sometimes called
alastrim) was a less common and genetically distinct form of the
variola virus [11]. In contrast to the 30–50% fatality rate of small-
pox, the Variola minor fatality rate was reportedly less than 1%.
Many Variola minor patients felt quite well, were mobile and were
able to infect their contacts, providing protection to Variola major
[12]. Vaccination and protective Variola minor exposure con-
tributed to smallpox eradication and likely reduced the number
of other human orthopox infections.
Just as smallpox virus appears to have evolved into two distinct
clades, so Monkeypox displays two distinct clades, Congo Basin
and West African [13]. With monkeypox, the Congo Basin clade
has reported mortality at about 10% [14], whereas theWest African
clade usually displays fatal outcomes in less than 1% of cases,
although, this was observed to be much higher in HIV patients [15].
As originally noted by Jenner, infection with one orthopox virus,
cowpox (and subsequently, vaccinia-derived vaccines), offered
smallpox protection. However, the proportion of smallpox vacci-
nated individuals has fallen from over 80% in1980, to less than
30% today [16]. In some developing nations, young non-
vaccinated individuals exceed 75% of the population [17]. Such
individuals are almost certainly susceptible to monkeypox virus
infection.
Monkeypox was first identified in Denmark in 1958, following
an outbreak of pustular disease in a macaque colony [18]. The
macaques had been imported from Singapore. The first human
monkeypox case was identified in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC, then Zaire) in 1970 as the incidence of smallpox
was decreasing [19,20]. The true burden of monkeypox disease isunknown, and many countries, which may harbour the disease,
have not included monkeypox screening into routine surveillance
systems. The prevalence of asymptomatic infection is not under-
stood, should it occur in human populations.
Despite-re-emergent human monkeypox disease, the animal
reservoirs of monkeypox viruses and the human behaviours that
facilitate initial animal to human transmission are unconfirmed.
It has been shown that in intermediate hosts the virus can be
transmitted from one animal to another, and subsequently to
humans. This occurred in the US Midwest outbreak, when 47 con-
firmed and probable cases, including many children, were infected
by prairie dogs thought to have contracted monkeypox from
rodents shipped to the United States from Ghana [21].
In June 2019 an informal seminar brought together a group of
experts to review the status of human monkeypox disease, high-
lighting facts and deficient understanding. Included in the group
were: epidemiologists based in the UK and the US; field epidemi-
ologists based in Nigeria and DRC where current outbreaks are
occurring; experts in DNA virus genomics and evolution; and
observers from a pharmaceutical company that has developed
and is marketing a non-replicating vaccine for both smallpox and
monkeypox indications.2. Re-emergent monkeypox in Africa
Hypothesised factors in the emergence or re-emergence of
monkeypox disease include [22,23]:
 Climate change
 Rain Forest exploitation
 Geopolitical and armed conflicts in disease areas
 Highly mobile populations
 Waning herd immunity, following cessation of smallpox
vaccination.
After the eradication of smallpox, there was concern that the
monkeypox virus might fill the epidemiological niche left by small-
pox [24]. Smallpox had no known zoonotic host and was transmit-
ted only on a human-to-human basis, whereas monkeypox may be
transmitted to man by animal hosts. WHO-sponsored serological
surveys were conducted in rural communities in West and Central
Africa where human monkeypox was sporadically occurring. Prior
to 1986, population-based surveys suggested that orthopox virus
antibodies were present in 12–15% of children. The mean age of
patients was just 44 years. Cases of monkeypox were linked to ani-
mal sources in 245 of 338 cases [25]. A major outbreak of human
monkeypox occurred in Katako-Combe, Zaire in 1996, From Febru-
ary 1996 to February 1997, 89 persons in this outbreak were diag-
nosed with human monkeypox [19,26]. 73% of cases reported
contact with another human case while 27% had known contact
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short and infrequent, variously reported as involving up to 3–5
non-vaccinated persons. Several longer chains of transmission
occurred during the 1996–1997 Katako-Combe outbreak, with up
to 7 non-vaccinated persons infected from the same index case.
From 1998, numbers of infections increased, with an increase in
mean age [25]. A 2007 study showed orthopox antibodies in
unvaccinated residents of the Likouala region (Republic of Congo,
ROC, not DRC) [27]. By 2006–7 a very significant 20–fold increase
in human monkeypox was reported in DRC [28]. Only245% of
the population appeared to have been vaccinated. Was this emerg-
ing infection out of control [29]?
In 2017, outbreaks of human monkeypox in Nigeria were pre-
ceded by very heavy rainfall and flooding that is hypothesised to
have brought animal hosts and human populations into close prox-
imity, as both sought higher ground and dry environments [30].
The outbreak was first reported to the Nigerian Centre for Disease
Control (NCDC) in September 2017, following an unknown rash ill-
ness in southern Nigeria, and regular reports followed [31]. Active
surveillance confirmed human monkeypox, and as of September
2019, a total of 176 human monkeypox cases had been confirmed
from 18 states [32,33].
Previously, there had been one reported outbreak of human
monkeypox in Nigeria in the 1970s, and after that, three sporadic
cases were reported before the onset of the 2017 epidemic [34].
The chains of transmission investigated in the current outbreak
suggest a primary infection contracted from an animal, with subse-
quent human-to-human transmission. Human-to-human trans-
mission has been demonstrated among family contacts, and in
prison populations, but human-to-human chain lengths appear to
be short at 1–3 individuals in each link, although this requires
more analysis [32,35]. Monkeypox laboratory diagnosis by PCR
has been established by NCDC [36] and suggests that young male
adults are most affected. A case fatality rate of 56% has been
recorded, with most deaths among HIV infected patients [37].
The case fatality rate, excluding those with HIV infection is
reported as <2%. Persons vaccinated prior to 1980 had a five–fold
lower risk of monkeypox compared to those who had not been vac-
cinated [24]. Human-to-human transmission of monkeypox is now
regularly observed and the disease has become more common.
Risk factors for infection are unclear, with confirmed animal con-
tact in approximately 10% of cases, while the prevalence of asymp-
tomatic infection, should it occur, remains unknown. Sexual
transmission has been hypothesised for some cases with genital
and groin lesions [37]. The current research focus in Nigeria is on epi-
demiological risk factors, animal reservoirs and HIV co-infection.
Control and prevention measures include education and personal
hygiene, drawing on known epidemiology and risk factors. Vaccina-
tion has been considered for healthcare workers in treatment centres
but was not initiated. Human monkeypox is being added to routine
disease surveillance protocols, with genomic studies and serological
surveys being planned. Additional questions that could be examined
include, transmission routes from human-to-human, and the natural
history of dual monkeypox/HIV infection.
Social issues have emerged, including the stigma of being diag-
nosed with monkeypox. One suicide was reported [37]. Many
patients with monkeypox feel relatively well and containment is
complicated by a desire to return to a normal life – often expressed
quite strongly. The same sentiment was expressed by a person sec-
ondarily infected in the 2018 UK cases [38].3. International spread of human monkeypox
In 2003 an outbreak of human monkeypox occurred in the USA
[21]. It was initiated by rodents imported from Ghana to be sold asexotic pets. It is thought that these rodents infected co-housed
prairie dogs, also sold as pets, through some type of animal to ani-
mal contact. 47 confirmed and probable cases were reported, but
there were no deaths. The outbreak consisted mainly of isolated
skin lesions. Smallpox vaccine (DryVax, Wyeth) was offered to
those who had direct physical contact with human cases and
rodents that were sold. Two cases in the 2003 outbreak in the
USA may have involved human-to-human transmission, but con-
tact with infected rodents could not be excluded.
In September 2018, there were two unrelated importations of
monkeypox to the UK, by two persons travelling from Nigeria
[39]. One was a Nigerian naval officer who came to the UK for a
training course. The other a Nigerian businessman. Both were well
before travelling, and developed skin lesions after arrival in the UK.
Soiled bedsheets probably led to infection of a hospital cleaner
[40], the first confirmed case of human-to-human transmission
outside Africa. In 2018, all UK patients were rapidly diagnosed
and isolated with over 200 contacts identified and offered small-
pox vaccination (Imvanex, Bavarian Nordic) [41,42]. In December
2019 a further case of human monkeypox was confirmed in the
UK, again imported from Nigeria [43]. Contact tracing was initiated
and smallpox vaccine (Imvanex) was procured.
In 2018 human monkeypox was imported to Israel by an Israeli
resident who lived and worked in Nigeria [44]. He became ill after
his return to Israel, and PCR and Electron Microscopy confirmed
infection with the monkeypox virus. Following diagnosis, the
patient was isolated, and 16 contacts were identified and offered
smallpox vaccination (ACAM2000, Emergent Biosolutions). No sec-
ondary transmission is known to have occurred [45].
In 2019, a Nigerian travelling to Singapore for a training course
developed skin lesions shortly after arrival and was diagnosed with
human monkeypox. 23 close contacts were identified, were offered
smallpox vaccination (ACAM2000) and were placed under quarantine
at home or in a government facility for 21 days monitoring [46,47].
The smallpox vaccines offered in all these instances were used
off license.4. New genomic tools aid diagnosis, epidemiology and
evolutionary studies
The monkeypox viruses isolated recently from patients in Nige-
ria, the UK, Israel and Singapore were quickly diagnosed and iden-
tified as West African monkeypox virus using PCR and genetic
sequencing. Recent studies of the monkeypox virus in the DRC
and Nigeria examined isolates from humans [48,49], and potential
animal hosts [50]. Complementing PCR, newer technologies such
as (Minion nucleotide sequencing (Oxford Nanopore) [51], might
allow field sequencing of the monkeypox virus in animals com-
monly killed as bushmeat. This technology can be used with little
infrastructure and ensures rapid data generation, as was demon-
strated in the West African Ebola outbreak of 2013–2016 [52].
Detailed animal data will require the establishment of protocols
for sample collection and preparation. To date, only anecdotal data
link bushmeat hunting and preparation with monkeypox infection.
Two major monkeypox clades–West African and Congo Basin–
have been identified [13], and all reported human monkeypox out-
side Africa has been caused by the West African clade [50]. West
African monkeypox is associated with lower mortality, less severe
illness, and less human-to-human transmission than Congo Basin
monkeypox. However, these observations were based on a small
number of infections (<100) observed since the 1970s. The larger
number of infections identified from Nigeria has shown that mor-
tality, severe illness, and human-to-human transmission can occur
[37]. More work is needed in order to fully describe the epidemiol-
ogy and impact of West African monkeypox.
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pox viruses differ in gene content, in particular genes affecting vir-
ulence and host range. Viruses with narrow host ranges contain
fewer genes, for example; variola virus has about 165 genes,
whereas those with broad host ranges have more. Cowpox viruses
contain about 214 genes. The smallpox virus encodes virulence fac-
tors that modulate the human immune system [53,54], and similar
virulence factors exist in monkeypox virus [55]. Understanding of
the genetic basis for these differences is incomplete. The availabil-
ity of additional full monkeypox virus genomes (currently there
are 59 complete genomes in the NCBI nucleotide database [56],
may allow researchers to observe future adaptations associated
with changes in virus properties.
The study of orthopox DNA isolated from historical samples
may provide information on the evolution, pathogenicity and sta-
bility of the monkeypox virus. The isolation of DNA from Hepatitis
B virus (HBV) and identification of HBV genotypes from human
remains up to 5000 years old illustrates this potential [57]. DNA
can be isolated from ancient biological material such as found in
burial sites and mummified remains [58]. DNA from monkeypox
virus has been isolated from skin samples of five species of African
rope squirrel (Funisciurus sp) up to 120 years old [59]. Appropriate
historical specimens could provide clues about reservoirs and
intermediate hosts, as well as past changes of the virus.
5. The future
Human monkeypox epidemiology has changed. With the cessa-
tion of widespread smallpox vaccination, increased study of the
monkeypox virus, the human disease it causes, and its epidemiol-
ogy are important. Monkeypox has been viewed as ‘‘just another
neglected disease”. Global travel and easy access to remote and
potentially monkeypox-endemic regions are a cause for increasing
global vigilance.
Investigation of humanmonkeypox outbreaks usingmodern tools
is increasing understanding of the epidemiology of human monkey-
pox, includingmeasures to prevent and respond to outbreaks. It must
be continued, and as further information becomes available it should
be used to parameterise epidemiological models in order to suggest
the comparative effectiveness of interventions such as isolation, safe
burial, contact tracing, antivirals and vaccines.
Funding for monkeypox research must be increased, and newly
emerged orthopox viruses that cause disease in humans such as
Akhmeta virus, identified in the Georgia Caucusus [60] or Alaska-
pox virus discovered in 2015 [61], add urgency to this need.
A recent systematic review of monkeypox epidemiology high-
lights both progress and deficits in our understanding [62]. Empha-
sis is placed on high-risk patient groups, nosocomial transmission
and genetic strains. As monkeypox is no longer a rare disease, there
is need for more rigorous epidemiological studies, with particular
reference to zoonotic hosts [63], transmission potential [64–66]
and human case severity. Enhanced fieldwork should address these
issues with particular reference to:
 Identification of wild species which harbour these viruses in differ-
ent areas of Africa
 Better definition of the clinical spectrum and severity of disease,
including asymptomatic carriage and risk factors for acquisition
 Improved description of outbreak patterns by size and duration
 Measurement of risk of transmission associated with different sorts
of contact with clinical cases
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